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I
INTRODUCTION

This is an account of one law school's experiment with teaching the required
professional responsibility course in the first year. From spring 1992 through
spring 1994, the University of California at Berkeley's School of Law (Boalt
Hall) taught a required two-unit' course entitled Legal Profession to all firstyear students, using a uniform set of teaching materials prepared and revised
with the generous support of the W.M. Keck Foundation.
During this experiment, the faculty members involved in the course
developed a strong set of teaching materials, a strong commitment to teaching
from those materials, and an unshakable conviction that the course could not
be taught properly in less than three units. The majority of Boalt's faculty were
unwilling to make three units available for legal ethics in the first year, but were
prepared to do so in the second year. Accordingly, at the close of our
experiment, the faculty voted to expand the course to three units and to move
the course to the second year.
The first part of this article presents the history of our required professional
responsibility course, explains why our faculty initially decided to move the
required course to the first year, and describes some important related decisions
that influenced the course's design and reception.
The next part of the article offers a history of the experiment, which
describes the curriculum we assembled, how we taught it, how the students
reacted (in a nutshell, not well), how we revised our curriculum and pedagogy
in light of that reaction, how the course improved, and how, notwithstanding
that improvement, we ultimately decided to move the course to the second year.
Copyright © 1996 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley.
Many people at Boalt Hall and elsewhere participated in the design, teaching, and evaluation of the
Legal Profession course, and all are responsible for whatever is good in what follows. For comments,
I am grateful to Bob Berring, Ed Frueh, Henry Hecht, Herma Hill Kay, Tom Metzloff, Eleanor Swift,
and David Wilkins. The views expressed and errors made in this piece, however, are mine.
1. In 1991, a two-unit course at Boalt Hall represented 30 instructor contact hours taken over a
15-week semester, and a three-unit course, 45 instructor contact hours. Since 1994, due to adjustments
in our schedule, two units has represented 28 contact hours taken over a 14-week semester and three
units has represented 42 contact hours. A typical first-year student takes 15 or 16 units each semester.
A typical second- or third-year student takes 13 or 14.
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The concluding section attempts to move beyond the gritty particulars of our
experience and to draw some tentative conclusions with broader application.
It argues that our experience is consistent with prior research finding that
student resistance to required professional responsibility instruction is more a
function of latent curricular messages than of the year in which the student
takes the course. In our case, the latent message that proved most potent and
enduring was that Legal Profession was the only two-unit required course in the
first year. Our experience also suggests that, because an important latent
curricular message in most law schools is that theoretical and empirical work is
not "real law," there may be real tension between achieving greater acceptance
of the course and exposing students to the best available thinking concerning
the profession they are about to enter. Ironically, that tension may be stronger
in the first year, when students are most focused on mastering conventional
legal analysis.
Because of the confounding presence of these latent messages, our
experiment cannot be regarded as a definitive test of the pedagogical effectiveness of first-year placement. Such a test would call for a course taught at the
same scale, and in the same manner, as traditional first-year courses. The case
for that sort of first-year legal ethics course, I argue, may be as strong as or
stronger than that for the prominence now given to other courses in the
traditional first-year curriculum.
II
BACKGROUND

In the spring of 1991, the faculty at Boalt Hall voted to institute a new twounit first-year course entitled Legal Profession. The two units needed to create
the course were taken from the Contracts and Civil Procedure courses, each of
which was reduced from six to five units. Upon motion of a Contracts
professor, the faculty agreed to make Legal Profession subject to a sunset
provision at the end of the second (later extended to the third) year in which
the course was offered. Unless extended at that witching hour, the first-year
placement of the course would cease and Contracts and Civil Procedure would
revert to their original lengths.
The decision to create a required first-year course in professional ethics
came against a background of mixed results with required ethics courses in the
second and third year. Beginning in the early 1980s, Boalt Hall had decided to
fulfill its obligation under American Bar Association ("ABA") Standard
302(a)(4) to provide "instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal
profession" and in the profession's "history, goals and structure, 2 by requiring
each student to take a course of at least two units concerning those subject
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matters during the student's second or third year of law school. The ethics
course thus became the school's only required offering after the first year. In
choosing this option, the faculty rejected the alternative of legal ethics
instruction by the pervasive method,3 both because we feared that instructors
in mainstream courses would not make a sufficient commitment of classroom
time and personal energy to ethics instruction, and because we had a cadre of
teachers who were prepared to participate, at least occasionally, in offering a
specialized course in the subject.
At the time we decided to require a stand-alone, specialized course, we also
committed to offer at least four courses per year satisfying the requirement, and
in a fair number of years we fulfilled that ambition. Most students fulfilled their
requirement in two-unit offerings entitled Professional Responsibility. The
format and content of those courses varied with the instructor. Some were quite
innovative,4 but many relied heavily on parsing the various professional codes.
In general, student reaction to those courses-as gauged by end-of-semester
evaluations-was more negative than their reactions to other second- and thirdyear courses and to other required courses (all of which were taught in the first
year). In consequence, although a number of instructors taught the course once
or twice, few instructors welcomed or accepted a regular assignment to teach it.
Other courses satisfying the ethics requirement ranged more widely. For
example, one course, entitled Business, Law, and Ethics, taught jointly by
Robert Cole and faculty members from the Haas Business School, began with
foundational works of modern ethical theory and applied those theories to
problems of moral reasoning and deliberation shared by lawyers and other
professional and managerial workers. When offered, the course drew between
20 and 30 percent of those students fulfilling their requirement.
From 1984 through 1991, slightly less than 10 percent of each graduating
class fulfilled their professional responsibility obligation in an ambitious fourunit seminar entitled Lawyers and Clients. As originally conceived by its
designers, Robert Post, Ed Rubin, and Henry Hecht, the class relied on several
innovations to generate deeper engagement with professional ethics issues and,
in particular, a better understanding of how professional norms and behavior are
influenced by the social context of legal practice.5 First, the instructors made
extensive use of theoretical and empirical scholarly works on both the legal
profession and professionalism more generally. Second, they taught much of the

3. The pervasive approach to teaching ethics involves introducing ethical issues piecemeal, in
different law school courses, by instructors who know the context well and who understand in detail
how legal rules, institutional arrangements, and ethical obligations interact in that context.
4. For example, Professor (now Judge) John Noonan, drawing on the Aristotelian conception of
the good life, and perhaps anticipating the vogue for narrative as legal methodology, taught a course
largely through the use of narratives drawn from the lives of renowned lawyers like Thomas More,
Louis Brandeis, Paul Cravath, and Abraham Lincoln.
5. In this regard, the course anticipated some important scholarly developments. See, e.g., David
B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799,877 (1992) (stressing the importance
of considering practice context for design of professional regulation).
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course through simulation and role-playing. Third, approximately half the
twenty-four students in each seminar combined the course with a clinical
outplacement. Clinical students were taught participant observation methodologies so that they could better integrate their classroom and clinical experiences.
The placements were designed to capture a range of practice experiences and
included work in plaintiffs' consumer law, large firm practice, a bank's in-house
counsel, the public defender and prosecutor's offices, and regulatory agencies
such as the EPA and the SEC. The reaction to Lawyers and Clients from the
students enrolled (all of whom had elected to take four units of legal ethics,
rather than just the required two) was considerably more positive than the
reaction to the regular professional responsibility course; instructors were
correspondingly more willing to teach it.
The faculty's decision to create the Legal Profession course and station it in
the first year was the sole survivor of a larger effort to reform the first-year
curriculum; the other elements died aborning in a two-day faculty retreat held
in 1990. The broader effort was an attempt to break up the steady stream of
appellate cases on private law topics to which first-years are exposed. Elements
of the strategy included reducing coverage in some first-year courses (or
deferring one or more of them to second year) and adding the required Legal
Profession course and a menu of courses dealing with applications of selected
social sciences and humanities to law (from which students would have been
required to select one). That the Legal Profession course proposal survived the
faculty skepticism that killed the other proposed reforms reflected the perceived
severity of the problems with the required second- and third-year professional
responsibility course.
The move to the first year was intended to address several concerns.
Perhaps most important, we hoped that placing the required course in the first
year would improve its reception with students, making it easier to teach and
hence easier to staff. First-year students, we theorized, are generally more
open, and less jaded, than their second- and third-year counterparts.6 In
addition, we believed that the professional ethics course had suffered from being
the only required course in second and third year, both because later placement
signaled that the course was less important than other required courses and also
because the requirement chafed more severely once students had a taste of
freedom in course selection. Consistent with this analysis, professors observed
that the most hostile student responses to the required course and the worst
teaching experiences consistently occurred with second-semester, third-year
students who had delayed the requirement until immediately before graduation.

6. This insight is obviously not new. One can find it in Karl Llewellyn's Bramble Bush, which first
appeared in 1930. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS
STUDY 134 (1930). More recently, systematic studies have documented the phenomenon of increasing
student disengagement and lack of interest in the second and third year. See Ronald M. Pipkin, Legal
Education: The Consumer's Perspective, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. JOURNAL 1161; Robert Stevens,
Law Schools and Law Students, 59 VA. L. REV. 551 (1973).
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Finally, some of us also thought we had observed a hunger among first-year
students to gain a better sense of the world of practice, and reasoned that an
ethics course with a practical component might satisfy that need.
Improved student reception was not the only-or for
some, even the
primary-gain expected from placing the course in the first' year. In the spring
of 1991, the time of the decision to move the course to the first year, many
faculty members were strongly influenced by the effect upon our students of the
boom in large firm hiring. The boom had made large firm jobs accessible to an
unprecedented number of our students, frequently at a very early stage of their
law school careers. In many cases, students were starting work at large law
firms in the summer after their first year, and some were accepting permanent
offers after that summer. We worried that students were making such
momentous choices so early in their professional education, without any
developed sense of the range of available professional opportunities and practice
settings. We hoped that offering an ethics course in the first year would make
our job-seekers better consumers, while also helping to dramatize issues about
the distribution of legal services and to keep alive for some students the
possibility of alternate forms of practice, whether in smaller firms, in government, or in public interest practice.7
For many faculty members, a major attraction of the proposed course was
its undertaking to replicate on a wider scale some of the successful innovations
of Lawyers and Clients. For a host of reasons, we could not link the basic
required course to live client clinicals or externships, as Lawyers and Clients
had. But we wanted to continue that course's focus on how the setting of
practice shapes lawyer obligations and conduct, its successful use of role-playing
and other simulations to encourage students to engage with the issues, and its
extensive use of theoretical and empirical literature on professionalism and the
profession. The latter feature in particular attracted faculty members who had
unsuccessfully sought to reform the first-year curriculum by adding courses with
social science and humanities perspectives, some of whom saw Legal Profession
as an entering wedge to a more comprehensive rethinking of the first-year
curriculum. To ensure that the benefits of these innovations were generally
disseminated, the faculty members who planned to teach the course agreed to
develop and utilize a common set of teaching materials, from which all sections
of the course would be taught.
We recognized that there were risks associated with our chosen approach.
First, most prospective teachers of the course believed that the importance of
the subject matter warranted allocating three units (forty-five classroom hours)
to the course, and that a longer course would be more interesting and more
likely to be taken seriously. But the majority of the faculty were not prepared
7. Cf. ROBERT V. STOVER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST

COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL 115-20 (Howard S. Erlanger ed., 1989) (urging law schools to use
the professional ethics course as part of a strategy to support public interest commitment against market
forces).
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to give up more than two units of the first-year curriculum to an ethics course.
A second risk was that first-year students would have little, if any, experience
of law practice to draw upon in interpreting the material. We therefore
seriously considered placing the course in the second year, where three units
could be had and the students would be more experienced than first-years but
not quite as "burnt-out" as third-years. We ultimately decided, however, that
the potential advantages of first-year placement were substantial enough to
warrant these risks.
After the faculty had decided to offer the first-year course, the Keck
Foundation made a substantial grant to Boalt Hall to support the development
of materials for legal ethics education. A portion of that grant was earmarked
to support the development of materials for a first-year course. Among other
things, that funding allowed us to devote additional faculty time to the
development of the materials and to call on several expert visitors for advice
and assistance in teaching the course. Another portion of the grant went to
support other Boalt faculty in developing "plug-in" professional ethics modules
for upperlevel courses. Although the faculty's vote to experiment with the firstyear course was made without regard to the possibility of foundation support,
there is no question that the Keck Foundation's generous and patient support
played an instrumental role in constructing a community of concerned scholars
and teachers and creating a workable set of teaching materials.
III
OUR EXPERIENCE WITH THE COURSE

Over the next three years, Boalt Hall's faculty made a major commitment
to the first-year course. Six faculty members taught Legal Profession one or
more times, each time teaching from the same materials as their colleagues.8
Those six were joined in teaching the materials by two visiting professors9 and
in revising the teaching materials by three visiting advisers and an experienced
The common materials and pedagogical strategy for the
clinical teacher.'
course were the product of extensive discussions and a level of collaborative
effort unique for our faculty. We followed up each iteration of the course with
detailed evaluations. In addition to our normal surveys of teaching effectiveness, we prepared a separate survey aimed at identifying how well students
thought the course had achieved the pedagogical aims that had guided our
design of the curriculum. Those aims included a better understanding of the
adversary system, of the lawyer's role morality, and of the relationship between
the student's own values and those espoused by the profession. We also
8. Those faculty members were Robert Berring, Stephen Bundy, Robert Post, Ed Rubin, Marjorie
Shultz, and Eleanor Swift.
9. The two visiting professors were John Leubsdorf of Rutgers-Newark and John Adler of the
University of San Francisco.
10. The four advisers were Leubsdorf, Deborah Rhode of Stanford, Marc Galanter of Wisconsin,
and Henry Hecht, a lecturer at Boalt with a strong background in the use of simulations in teaching.
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conducted a series of small focus group interviews in which we debriefed
students about their course experiences.
Our initial collaborative effort at a common curriculum drew heavily on the
Lawyers and Clients seminar, particularly its emphasis on generous excerpts
from classic scholarly texts on the adversary system and the legal profession.
Thus, our initial syllabus featured, among others, Lon Fuller on the justifications
for the adversary system, 1 Malcolm Feeley and Robert Kagan on the political
theory of adversarial legalism,12 Douglas Rosenthal on models of the lawyerclient relationship, 3 David Luban on ethical frameworks for evaluation of
negotiation outcomes, 4 and W. Richard Scott on conflicts between professional
and bureaucratic modes of organization. 5 Because of our enthusiasm for these
works and our desire to give students a real sense of their messages, the articles
were often presented in substantially complete form, without extensive editing.
We also drew initially on simulations developed for Legal Profession, including
a well-worn negotiation simulation and a simulation of a large firm's decision
to raise its starting salaries. 6
In its initial iteration, the course fell well short of our aims. Student reaction
was strongly negative, as reflected in evaluations both of instructors' effectiveness and of the course's success in achieving its pedagogical goals. This negative
reaction had a number of components. First, the effort to squeeze the course
into two units in the second semester of first year hurt its effectiveness, because
students perceived it both as the only two-unit required course and as the
"extra" course in the already crowded second-semester curriculum. Second, our
hypothesis that first-year students would prove markedly more open to ethics
education was too optimistic. As had been the case with our former offerings,
a substantial number of first-year students continued to object to the study of
legal ethics as patronizing, preachy, irrelevant, or intellectually soft. Our
extensive initial use of theoretical and empirical materials from the cognate
social sciences and humanities contributed to student dissatisfaction. In their
course evaluations, students objected to such materials as "long," "boring,"
"irrelevant," "pompous," or, worst of all, "academic." Third, as often happens,
the initial version of the teaching materials was too long and insufficiently
edited.

11. Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report of the Joint Conference,
44 A.B.A. J. 1159 (1958).
12. Malcolm Feeley, The Adversary System, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM: STUDIES OF THE PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES OF LAW 753-66 (1987); Robert

A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 369,
371-79 (1991).
13. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).

14. David Luban, Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and Informal Justice,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397 (1985).

15. W. Richard Scott, Professionals in Bureaucracies: Areas of Conflict, in PROFESSIONALIZATION
265 (H.M. Vollmer & D.L. Mills eds., 1966).
16. The latter simulation was based on prior work by Michael Kelly of Maryland. See Michael
Kelly, Mulroney Moreland and Fox Analyze the Doctrine of Cravatheat Emptor (undated xerograph).
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Nonetheless, it was apparent that the materials had promise. In particular,
the use of simulations was an important strength. In the first year we taught the
course, we developed two simulations dealing with lawyers in counseling and
negotiation roles. These simulations were effective teaching tools, were well
received by students, and have been adopted elsewhere. 7
In response to these initial reactions, we did a wholesale revision of the
course materials in both the second and the third year that the course was
offered. We added problems drawn from practice and role-plays involving
legislative and large firm settings. We reduced the length of the materials, while
at the same time giving more prominence to doctrine and less to theoretical and
empirical materials. This last shift was painful, because exposing our students
to theoretical and empirical social science materials had been a principal
objective of the course. But we knew we had to cut, and given the negative
student reaction to its use, the academic literature seemed a good place to start.
As we considered the question, we received conflicting advice from our outside
advisers, with a social scientist arguing that we should increase the use of social
science materials, a leading casebook author advising that extensive use of the
social science materials would severely hinder the adoption of the course
materials at other schools, and a reporter for the Restatement of Law
Governing Lawyers arguing that the course was insufficiently doctrinal. Some
of those who worked on the materials still believe that the decision to shift
coverage in this fashion was a mistake.
Another major revision involved the steps that Professors Marjorie Shultz
and Eleanor Swift, two of our most gifted and engaged instructors, took to
improve the reception of the course, as taught in larger sections of sixty or
ninety students. The strategies used by each professor had common structural
elements: creating smaller ad hoc working and discussion groups within the
class; requiring students to prepare more individual and group written exercises;
and providing more feedback on the student output from those exercises. In

17. The first simulation, broadly modeled on a classic problem in legal ethics, involved counseling
a client with a technical statute of limitations defense to an otherwise legally and morally compelling
claim for breach of contract. Students were assigned to play the roles of both lawyer and client. Apart
from the core problem of counseling ethics, the factual situation was written to highlight other
normative problems central to the course, including the ethical responsibilities of law firm associates
and of lawyers counseling organizational clients. This simulation has since been used both as part of
Stanford Law School's Introduction to Legal Ethics program and at the University of San Francisco.
The second simulation was a reworking of the Valdez v. Ace Auto Repair negotiation, originally
drafted by Steve Pepe when he was at the University of Michigan and elaborated by, among others,
Gary Bellow and Bea Moulton. The Valdez simulation places students in the role of lawyers for the
plaintiff and defendant seeking to settle a wrongful death claim. As traditionally presented, the
hypothetical raises issues about candor in negotiation, the use and abuse of strong bargaining positions,
and the line between legitimate predictions and illegitimate threats. Traditionally, those issues were
raised almost exclusively for the defendant's lawyer, with plaintiff's lawyer playing the role of a patsy.
Our principal contribution was to balance out the ethical freighting of the exercise by creating some
candor and disclosure issues for the plaintiff's counsel as well. As revised, the exercise is now featured
in the teacher's edition of Rhode and Luban's second edition of Legal Ethics. DEBORAH L. RHODE
& DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHIcs (2d ed. 1995).
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one section, these strategies were supplemented by efforts to increase the
frequency and intensity of student engagement by linking ethics issues with
training in critical professional skills. This clinical strategy expanded the
number of role-play exercises in the course and linked those role-plays to the
development of interviewing, counseling, and negotiation skills. Students
received additional readings and supplemental classroom lectures that focused
solely on the skills component of the exercises. One cost of these steps to
improve student engagement with the course was the extraordinary demand, in
terms of time and energy, that it placed on the large section instructors. The
other cost was the effective loss of uniformity in curriculum and approach, as
each instructor made deletions, additions, and substitutions in an effort to make
the material work more effectively with his or her teaching style.
Our refinements to the course resulted in a significant improvement in
student reactions. Teacher effectiveness ratings rose significantly. More
importantly, there was a dramatic and favorable change in how students
evaluated our success in achieving the pedagogical goals of the course, an
improvement that was strongest in courses where innovative strategies had been
used. By spring 1994, students rated the course materials and the educational
value of the course significantly higher, along a variety of measures, than in
spring 1992, when the course was first offered.
Nonetheless, the course remained relatively unpopular and difficult to teach,
especially in large sections. 8 In each year that we offered the course, the
instructors' ratings for the course were significantly below those for other large
first-year courses, despite the fact that the course instructors included several of
Boalt Hall's best regarded teachers. 9 And in large classes where instructors
failed to make special efforts like those of Professors Shultz and Swift, the
results were sometimes as bad as the worst outcomes of the old regime.
IV
THE DECISION TO MOVE THE COURSE TO THE SECOND YEAR

When it came time to take stock of the course, those who had been most
involved recommended to the faculty that the course be expanded to three
units, that students be required to take the course in their second year, and that
the policy of uniform course materials be abandoned.
The only action on which there was strong consensus was expanding the
course to three units. Those who had designed and taught the materials
believed that the two-unit required course had been intolerably rushed and
truncated, that the importance of the course and tremendous growth in the
volume and complexity of the relevant law and academic literature fully
warranted a required three-unit course, and that limiting the course to two units

18. As one student put it, "[iut's not easy to discuss Durkheim with 100 of your closest friends."
19. In addition, every instructor in the Legal Profession course had instructor ratings significantly
below those which they received in other courses that they taught over the same time span.
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had been an important reason why many students had viewed it as an "add-on"
or academic stepchild.2'
The decision to expand to three units was in turn decisive of the issue of
first-year placement. It had been a struggle to pry loose two units from
Contracts and Civil Procedure: There was no support for further shrinking
another first-year course, and there was considerable concern that even the twounit course had badly overcrowded the first-year spring. If the course were to
be taught in three units, it had to be moved out of the first year.
Would we have kept the course in the first year had space been available for
a three-unit course? Certainly some faculty members would have strongly
recommended keeping the course in the first year, and one or two might even
have advocated moving it to the first semester of the first year. But all
recognized that the case for leaving the course in first year was less promising
than it had appeared in 1991. Our 1991 view of how first-year students would
respond to the course had been naive. Our experience suggested that some
level of resistance to a required course on professional issues may be inevitable.
For some first-years, that resistance is tempered by their openness to new
experiences and their eagerness to understand their metamorphosis into a
professional. For others, though, such inquiries trigger resistance. Such students
may benefit from later exposure after practice experience generates greater
awareness of the real significance of ethical issues.2 '
External events also eroded some faculty members' enthusiasm for first-year
placement. Shortly after we moved the course to the first year, the large law
firm boom ceased, and over the following two years it became clear that law
firm hiring was unlikely to return to the superheated days of the late 1980s.
Large law firm opportunities for our first-year students largely dried up and
those for our second- and third-year students contracted significantly. As
students' career trajectories resumed a more traditional shape, the need to
provide an early exposure to a broader range of practice settings and ethical
issues came to seem less urgent.
Given the change in the hiring market, the recognized disadvantages of firstyear placement again loomed larger, including notably the students' near total
lack of practice experience. In addition, their lack of exposure to relevant
advanced courses, such as Criminal Procedure, Corporations, Tax, and Environ20. For a similar analysis, see Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional
Responsibility: A CurricularParadox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247, 252 (noting that the number
of units allocated may be a cue to the "latent hierarchy" of law school courses, with fewer units
indicating a lower hierarchical status).
21. There is, of course, some support for the view that practice experience leaves students doubting
the significance of ethical norms. See, e.g., Lawrence K. Hellman, The Effects of Law Office Work on
the Formation of Law Students' Professional Values: Observation, Explanation, Optimization, 4 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 537 (1991). It is striking, however, that many of the student interns in Hellman's
sample, drawn from a single law school, worked in smaller personal injury and workers' compensation
firms, a practice arena that may be unrepresentative. Id. at 557-63. My own observation is that work
experience across a broader range of practice settings tends to give students and recent graduates a
stronger sense of the salience of ethical concerns and of the real consequences of ethical missteps.
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mental Law, made it more difficult to teach important and conceptually
demanding topics, such as compliance counseling, opinion letters, client perjury,
and representation of corporations and other organizations.
The decision to move the course to the second year strongly influenced the
difficult decision to abandon the commitment to teaching all sections of the
course with the same materials. Much collective effort had been invested in
devising and improving the course materials, and most of the Boalt Hall faculty
members who planned to keep teaching in the field intended to continue using
those materials. However, there were both pedagogical and practical
advantages in restoring the potential for diversity. In our efforts to make the
course more effective, each instructor had developed a set of topics that she
viewed as more important and a set of strategies that she viewed as pedagogically effective. Thus, many of us felt it would be a step backward to return to a
uniform approach.
It also seemed possible that the students might benefit from a range of
approaches. Students who resisted ethics education because it was not "law"
could be taught a course stressing the complex legal issues and demanding
judgments that increasingly typify professional regulation. Students who wanted
to address issues of personal identity, moral decisionmaking, and the professional role might well be reached by a different course. And the handful of students
who wanted a richer exposure to theoretical and empirical perspectives could
be reached by still a third course.
The potential for variety seemed necessary to recruit teachers, as well.
Because of the high degree of personal commitment required to overcome
student resistance and teach the course effectively, we wanted to allow new
instructors from our own faculty to pursue distinct personal approaches.
Moreover, we knew that given the competing demands on our faculty resources,
we would sometimes have to call on visiting professors to teach the course, and
felt we might have difficulty recruiting them if they had to alter their own
approaches to conform to ours.
V
REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS

Our experience reflects themes familiar to American legal education: strong
student resistance to required legal ethics education; the difficulty of supporting
an institutional commitment to required legal ethics education for all graduates
in an era of constrained resources; and the difficulty of major curricular reform,
especially in the first-year curriculum. What I notice first, however, is how
much of our decisionmaking was driven by the particular practical constraints
of our situation and our institutional history. Certainly neither those advising
the faculty nor the faculty itself had a worked-out theory of professional ethics
education. Our horizons were largely limited by what had gone before and by
the faculty's limited interest in reforming the first year. Nor did we have first-
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class data supporting our decisions. 22 Instead, we relied on intuitions about the
dynamics of first-year and upperlevel education and expectations about the job
market-for our students that proved unfounded.
I do not note the relatively unsystematic character of our approach in a
critical spirit, 2 but rather because I think it is typical of how professional
responsibility instruction has evolved at many schools-incrementally, in accord
with faculty energies and interests, other perceived curricular needs, and
intuitive experiential judgments of teachers in the field.
Despite these peculiar local elements, the student response to our course is
consistent with earlier research findings, notably Ronald Pipkin's excellent study
of student resistance to professional ethics education.24 Pipkin's principal
finding was that such resistance is less a result of the student's year in school
than of what he calls "latent" curricular messages, including the number of units

assigned to the course and whether the course is taught by the traditional
Socratic method or as a discussion course. One implication of Pipkin's findings
is that, in order to be accepted, a legal ethics course ought to become as much

like a traditional law course as possible, increasing the number of units, stressing
law over theoretical, empirical, or clinical approaches, and preferring Socratic
interrogation or lecture to open discussion.
Pipkin's account suggests that we may well have been right in our instinct
that first-year placement would help the reception of Legal Profession by
emphasizing its centrality, but that we did not go far enough in altering the
negative latent messages associated with the course. By keeping the course at
two units, when other first-year courses were taught in three-, four-, or five-unit
blocks, we made it clear that Legal Profession was, in our view, the least
important of those courses. Similarly, by deemphasizing the law of professional
ethics, in favor of the theory and sociology of professionalism and the adversary
system and the use of simulation role-plays, we marked the course as different
and perhaps presumptively less rigorous than traditional courses. More
speculatively, one might wonder whether the academic cast of the course did not

end up hurting us more with first-year students than it would have with secondor third-year students, precisely because first-year students are so invested in
mastering traditional doctrinal and policy analysis. I have often wondered, for
example, whether the student who told me that she liked the course readings

22. Because of our efforts at evaluation, the data supporting our move back to the second year was
much better than that which supported the initial move to the first year.
23. Despite its somewhat ad hoc and innocent quality, I am proud of our effort. We developed a
strong set of teaching materials and a strong cadre of teachers committed to their use. We learned

valuable information about legal ethics teaching, including that we could teach a viable and increasingly
effective course in the first year. As a result of our experiment, we reestablished the course in the
second year, allocated more units to it, and eliminated the resistant, angry third-year students who made
the former professional responsibility course pedagogically and personally difficult. I believe we made
the right decision at each turn, given the fundamental constraint that the faculty was unwilling to
consider further reform of the first-year curriculum.
24. Pipkin, supra note 20, at 247.
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because they "reminded her of being an undergraduate" intended the remark
in a wholly complimentary spirit.
This analysis has two implications, one less cheering and the other more so.
The less cheering implication is that certain types of required professional ethics
courses-specifically, those that contain a heavy admixture of theory and
empirical evidence-may not be viable even at relatively "academic" law
schools. Indeed, the implication may be that because ethics courses are not well
established in the curriculum, such courses may be even less viable than in
other, better established fields. Consistent with this hypothesis, the trend in
professional ethics education is toward teaching materials that stress law rather
than ethics and the external rather than internal regulation of lawyers. At one
level, one can hardly object to this trend. There is lots of "law of lawyering"
that is worth learning. Moreover, careful attention to the considerations which
shape that law can go far to illuminate how a lawyer ought to act when the legal
rules governing her conduct cease to provide clear guidance or, perhaps more
radically, when those rules seem clearly unjust.25 It is also difficult to criticize
reforms that enhance student willingness to engage with legal ethics, and, over
time, the willingness of law teachers to do so as well. On the other hand, if
there is any area where lawyers ought to have a more empirically grounded,
theoretically sophisticated understanding of what is at stake, it is legal ethics, for
two reasons. First, as legislators and leaders of the organized profession,
lawyers largely design the relevant rules. Second, lawyers are the people who
must abide by those rules and accept moral responsibility for actions taken
pursuant to them. On this view, the broader acceptance of "law of lawyering"
ethics education will not be without real costs.
The second, perhaps more encouraging, implication is that our brief
experiment at Boalt Hall does not yield firm general conclusions about the
value of a required first-year course or even about the value of the sort of firstyear course that we ran. To do so, in my judgment, we would at a minimum
have had to offer a three-unit course in a revised and more spacious second
semester, allowing adequate treatment and impressing on students the
seriousness of the enterprise. Arguably, we also would have had to try the
course in the first semester, the prime time both for catching students at their
most receptive and the best possible way to demonstrate the course's importance and conceptual centrality. And certainly we would have had to give the
course more time to become a familiar feature of the first-year landscape. It
suffered from being the new or "extra" course in the first year, an effect that
would have dissipated over time.
Was our faculty wrong, then, to resist giving up three units of the first-year
to Legal Profession? Had the issue been raised, would they have been wrong
to oppose a three- or four-unit legal profession course in the first semester? A

25. For examples of works suggesting the possibility of an individual professional ethic based on
the reasons underlying the rules of professional responsibility, see note 30, infra.
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full canvass of these issues would take us far afield, into the design of the firstyear curriculum and hotly contested questions like the "right" number of units
allocated to beginning Contracts, Torts, and Civil Procedure. Before one
reaches those issues, one has to have a theory of the role of the first-year
courses and of how legal ethics education fits with that theory. Certainly there
is a very plausible account of legal education in which an introductory course
in professional ethics is more central to the law school curriculum than any
other present first-year courses. It runs as follows.
Suppose we started with the lay public's view, which sees the central
problem with lawyers not as lack of competence, but as a lack of ethical
standards. On this account, the law and ethics of lawyering2 6 lies at the core
of professional education, so much so that leaving the subject until later would
make the first-year curriculum profoundly misleading, both ethically and
substantively. By focusing exclusively on learning the "law" and the tropes of
argument and interpretation that lawyers use to serve their clients, the standard
first-year curriculum falsely implies that the only important ethical issues are
those of competent performance within a well-functioning attorney-client
relationship and a well-functioning adversary system. This renders invisible
virtually all the difficult and important issues of professional obligation and
system design, and gives students a highly distorted-and potentially dangerous-picture of their future professional role. Is it any wonder that after this
introduction, many students wonder about the relevance of professional ethics
instruction?
But even if competent practice were the sole aim of first-year instruction, the
omission of ethics issues would be hard to defend. I would argue that a lawyer
cannot accurately grasp the contours, significance, or potential for reform of
U.S. law without understanding the core material of legal ethics. That material
includes, at a minimum, the role of lawyers in making, shaping compliance with,
and enforcing the law, this country's increasingly controversial attachment to the
adversary system, and the circumstances under which actors have access to legal
counsel or advocacy. A legal ethics course is also the natural setting to discuss
the policy preferences that underly our nation's perennial (and presently heated)
national debates about regulation, litigation, and the role of lawyers. Those
include our continuing national preferences for weak, poorly funded, and highly
politicized governmental and judicial authorities, for litigated, rather than
consensual, solutions to problems of governance, and for political and legal
processes dominated by private parties and their lawyers.27 Finally, the legal
ethics course offers students a chance to consider potentially important modes
of legal regulation-such as selection on the basis of personal character,

26. I borrow here from the title of Geoffrey Hazard, Susan Koniak and Roger Cramton's excellent
book. GEOFFREY HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1994).
27. See, e.g., MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986); Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism

and American Government, 10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991).
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professional socialization, reputation, and professional discipline-that they will

not encounter elsewhere in the curriculum. 2
With all that said, however, one might still doubt that first-year placement

is ideal. As our brief experiment at Boalt Hall taught us, there is clearly a sense

in which Legal Profession is an advanced course. Its full development is
parasitic on students' basic familiarity with critical concepts of legal obligation
and procedural regularity and on their emerging awareness, based on exposure
to law office work in clinical, part-time, or summer employment, of the practical
significance of professional ethics and ethical decisionmaking.
This concern might argue for later placement of the course. Or it might
point in the direction of the pervasive approach, which permits basic ethical and
institutional concepts to be introduced in traditional first-year courses, and then

developed and elaborated in advanced courses. In advanced elective courses,
such an approach also has the potential advantage of enlisting the student's

enthusiasm for the underlying subject matter in support of the study of the
related ethical questions.

While these attractions are real, the pervasive approach suffers from two
crippling drawbacks. First, by giving the pieces of legal ethics a home everywhere, it effectively deprives its core concepts of a home anywhere. Without
a required course with significant content, there is no place in which students
and instructors confront, in any probing or systematic way, the central ethical
concepts, institutional and political understandings, and regulatory alternatives
Put more
that underlie all areas of professional ethics and regulation."
bluntly, without a required course, pervasive ethics is in danger of becoming
parochial ethics: It does not provide the kind of centered, comprehensive
understanding of the lawyer's role that is the foundation of reflective professional practice. 3 Moreover, the brief courses that serve as introductions to the
pervasive ethics curriculum--often only a few hours, seldom more than a
week-do not appear to satisfy the basic conditions of duration and intensity
28. Of course, much of first-year legal education is skills education, notably in the reading of cases
and, to a lesser extent, statutes. The legal profession curriculum has a lot of material that is well suited
to this sort of skills instruction. Many relevant doctrines, such as agency and fiduciary obligation,
involve common law concepts, while the professional rules provide rich opportunities for statutory
interpretation.
29. For example, I visited at Stanford this fall and found myself playing a not insubstantial role in
the first-year introduction to Stanford's pervasive ethics program. That program involves about 60
pages of assigned reading, a movie, and a total of five hours of class discussion and lecture. Students
prepared a single, brief, ungraded written assignment based on that work. Given the other demands
of their scheduled, graded first-semester classes and of the legal writing course, I do not doubt that a
more intensive introduction would overburden students. On the other hand, I wonder whether such
a brief exposure to fundamental ethical issues, under such inauspicious conditions, provides an adequate
foundation for developing the issues in other courses or for reflective professional practice.
30. Indeed, it seems to me that the most illuminating insights into the lawyer's legal and ethical
obligations, of the kind reflected in the best academic studies, can scarcely be developed or appreciated
outside the context of a course which takes a comprehensive view of the subject. See, e.g., Fuller &
Randall, supra note 11; Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. REV.
589 (1985); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1987); David
B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 801 (1992).
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that researchers have identified as essential for ethics education to "take" in a
way that produces lasting differences in ethical orientation.
The second problem with pervasive ethics is suggested by Pipkin's law of
latent curricular messages. 32 It seems inevitable that by treating ethics in a
manner different from, say, contracts or torts, the pervasive curriculum runs a
large risk of conveying the message that ethics education is not nearly as
important as courses in the other subjects, and hence a risk of engendering
resistance or disengagement on a massive scale. It may be that the pervasive
method conveys that message so powerfully that no degree of pedagogical
dedication can overcome it. At a minimum, Pipkin's analysis suggests that
pervasive ethics education cannot succeed without an unusually strong
pedagogical commitment from instructors in substantive courses. But the
evidence from schools where the pervasive method has been attempted suggests
that the opposite is true: Most instructors in substantive courses convey the
distinct impression that ethics is an add on.
Given the attendant risks and benefits of each of the options, the ideal
solution might well be some combination of a required first-year course and
pervasive instruction in the second and third years. Indeed, such a model is
implied in our school's Keck Foundation grant program of first-year materials
followed by advanced modules in other courses. Many readers are undoubtedly
inclined to reject this idea as either utopian or wasteful of scarce resources that
ought to be directed elsewhere. Before doing so, they would do well to note
that such a system is already in effect for courses like Contracts, Property, and
Civil Procedure. Having made these courses the foundations of first-year legal
education, we replay and elaborate upon their central structures and concepts
in second- and third-year classes. In fact, most of our advanced curriculum
relies on and refers repeatedly to that earlier instruction. Neither teacher nor
student regards the additional attention to those concepts as excessive, in part
because they are understood to be fundamentally important and in part because
it is necessary to recall them in order to understand more advanced concepts.
Measured against this utopian standard, I view the outcome of our
experiment as an incremental step in the right direction. We learned a powerful
lesson-lowering student resistance to the legal profession course in the first
year, or anywhere else, depends on making the course a full-fledged and equal
part of the curriculum. Since we could not accomplish that in the first year, the
faculty has established the core course in a place where we can devote adequate
attention (and expanded faculty resources) to it while avoiding the worst
problems of third-year cynicism and burnout. Along the way, our extensive
collaboration on the materials for the course has developed a cadre of faculty

31. For example, Professor Rest's review of a host of studies seeking to measure the effect of ethics
education on ethical judgment found that courses of short duration have no impact on ethical judgment.
The strongest effects are found for courses of four to twelve weeks duration. JAMES R. REST ET AL.,
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCES IN RESEARCH AND THEORY 59 (1986).
32. See Pipkin, supra note 20.
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with substantive and pedagogical expertise, who will be available to staff the
basic course in the future and who, we hope with some confidence, will bring
to their instruction in other courses a sensitivity to professional issues that over
time may lead. to a more pervasive education that builds on a solid foundation
established early in law students' academic careers.

